Don’t blame the norms! On the challenges of ecological rationality by Boudry, Maarten et al.


Chapter 6 
'RQ¶W Blame the Norm. On the Challenge of 
Ecological Rationality 
Maarten Boudry1, Michael Vlerick2 & Ryan McKay3
1 Department of Philosophy & Moral Sciences, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium, maartenboudry@gmail.com;
2 Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa;  
3ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, 
University of London Egham, Surrey, United Kingdom. 
Abstract. Enlightenment thinkers viewed logic and mathematical probability as the hallmarks of 
rationality. In psychological research on human (ir)rationality, human subjects are typically held 
accountable to this arcane ideal of Reason. If people fall short of these traditional standards, as indeed 
they often do, they are biased or irrational. Recent work in the program of ecological rationality, 
however, aims to rehabilitate human reason, and to upturn our traditional conception of rationality in 
the process. Put bluntly, these researchers are turning the tables on the traditionalist, showing that 
human reasoning often outperforms complex algorithms based on the traditional canons of rationality. 
If human reason still appears paltry from the vantage point of capital-R Rationality, then so much the 
worse for Rationality. Maybe the norms themselves are in need of revision. Perhaps human reasoning 
is better than rational. Though we welcome the naturalization of human reason, we argue that this 
backlash against the classical norms of rationality is uncalled for. Ecological rationality presents two 
apparent challenges to the traditional canons of rationality. In both cases, we contend, the norms 
emerge unscathed. In the first category, norms of rationality that appear violated by individual 
reasoners re-emerge at the level of evolutionary adaptation. In the second category, the norms under 
challenge simply turn out to be not applicable to the case at hand. Moreover, we should keep in mind 
that, when they are assessing the efficiency of human reasoning, advocates of ecological rationality 
still use the traditional norms of rationality as a benchmark. We conclude that, even if we accept all 
the fascinating findings garnered by the advocates of ecological rationality (and there is ample reason 
to do so), we need not be taken in by the rhetoric against classical rationality, or the false opposition 
between logical and ecological rationality. When the dust has settled, the norms are still standing.   
1. Introduction 
The rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment conceived of human reason as a unique and 
defining faculty lifting us above the realm of nature and radically separating humans from 
animals (Talmont-Kaminski, 2007). The canons of rationality, according to Enlightenment 
thinkers, were logic and mathematical probability. Of course, Enlightenment thinkers were 
well aware that the average human falls short of this ideal. In practice, they admitted, 
reason is often clouded by prejudice, emotion and magical thinking. In one of the dualities 
typical of Enlightenment thinking, rationality was set in stark contrast to the dark and 
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irrational forces of human nature. Irrationality, indeed, was characterized as a different 
mode of thinking altogether, a sui generis form of deficient reasoning. 
,QWKHZDNHRI'DUZLQ¶VWKHRU\RIHYRlution by natural selection and the maturation of 
psychology as a scientific discipline, human reason has been brought down to earth. Human 
rationality is a natural faculty acquired over a long process of undirected evolution, not a 
spark of divinity separating us from the lower animals. Still, the traditional canons of 
rationality were upheld as a yardstick to measure the performance of human reason. Not 
that human reasoning lived up to the ideal. As cognitive psychologists began to investigate 
actual human reasoning, they amassed a wealth of evidence that is quite an embarrassment 
to our self-image as Rational Animals: we suffer from all sorts of incorrigible biases and 
commit elementary fallacies of logic and probability. Popular summaries of research on 
irrationality are fond of putting humans down: we are characterised as stupid, irrational, 
mindless, biased and stubborn (Sutherland, 2007; Singer & Benassi, 1981; Shermer, 2011; 
Ariely, 2009; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1996; Polonioli, 2013). De-biasing efforts seem 
undertaken to little avail, or even backfire: we often fail to learn from our mistakes. Many 
VKDUHWKHVHQWLPHQWH[SUHVVHGE\%HUWUDQG5XVVHOO³0DQLVDUDWLRQDODQLPDO²so at least I 
have been told. Throughout a long life, I have looked diligently for evidence in favor of this 
VWDWHPHQWEXWVRIDU,KDYHQRWKDGWKHJRRGIRUWXQHWRFRPHDFURVVLW´5XVVHOOS
69)  
Luckily, Homo sapiens is not completely beyond the pale. The psychologists who have 
documented and corrected our mistakes are members of the human species, after all. If they 
FDQVSRWWKHHUURUVRIWKHLUIHOORZKXPDQEHLQJVWKHQSHUKDSVZHFDQFRUUHFWHDFKRWKHU¶V
blind spots, and all is not lost. This line of reasoning assumes, however, that those who 
chastise human reason are not deluded themselves. Psychologists, when accusing their 
subjects of cognitive error, usually use some established rule of logic and probability as a 
benchmark. (Nisbett & Ross 1980; Kahneman, Slovic et al. 1982). But what if the norms 
themselves are in need of revision? Perhaps human reason looks irrational only because we 
are applying bad or inappropriate norms.  
This is exactly the promise held out by the program of ecological rationality. Launched 
by Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter Todd in the late 1990s, and mostly centered around the 
Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) centre in Berlin, this research program aims to 
unseat our traditional view of rationality and thereby rehabilitate human reason. Starting 
from the finding that our simple heuristics perform very well in ecologically valid contexts, 
even outperforming algorithms based on classical rationality (on which more below), these 
researchers have turned the tables on Classical Rationality: if human reason appears paltry 
seen from the vantage point of Rationality, then so much the worse for our capital-R ideal 
of Rationality. In other words: down with the norms. 
Is this backlash against traditional normative criteria of rationality warranted? We 
explore two ways in which the program of ecological rationality might seem to pose a 
threat to the classical norms. In both cases, we will see that the norms are actually left 
LQWDFW )LUVW E\ SUHVHQWLQJ WKH SURZHVV RI KXPDQ UHDVRQLQJ LQ DQ ³HFRORJLFDOO\ YDOLG´
context, defenders of ecological rationality have not so much jettisoned the traditional 
QRUPVDVUHOHJDWHGWKHPWRWKHORFXVRIHYROXWLRQDU\DGDSWDWLRQ7KH³UDWLRQDOLW\´RIKXPDQ
cognition simply re-HPHUJHV DW WKH HYROXWLRQDU\ OHYHO 6HQVLEOH ³GHFLVLRQV´ PDGH E\
evolution (i.e. solutions to adaptive problems) may translate into mindless or even norm-
violating behaviour at the level of individual reasoners. This point is based on the concept 
of locus shift, which we developed in an earlier paper, in the context of human irrationality 
(Boudry, Vlerick, & McKay, 2015). 
Second, we discuss cases where human reasoning appears to violate some norm of 
rationality, but on closer inspection, these instances simply fall outside the domain of 
application of those norms, through no fault of the latter. Again, the norms are left standing. 
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Once the dust has settled, the backlash against traditional canons of rationality seems 
unwarranted. Traditional conceptions of rationality remain valid after the human mind has 
been thoroughly naturalized.  
2. Ecological Rationality 
The debate over human rationality has been waged for decades (Stein, 1996; Evans & Over, 
1996; Krueger & Funder, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Ever 
since its emergence in the 1970s, the heuristics and biases program spawned by Kahneman 
and Tversky has had its detractors. For example, psychologist David Funder lamented the 
negative slant in much cognitive and social psychology (Funder, 1987), particularly the bad 
habit of interpreting any deviation from content-blind norms of reasoning as ipso facto
GHPRQVWUDWLRQV RI ³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´ 7KLV ³RQH-VLGHG HPSKDVLV RQ ZKDW SHRSOH GR ZURQJ´
(Funder, 1987, p. 83) results in an endless compendium of fallacies and biases, with little 
understanding of underlying cognitive processes. In a paper co-written with Dianne 
.UXHJHUKHZULWHVWKDWPDQ\RIKLVFROOHDJXHVVWLOOKDYHDQ³LQRUGLQDWHIRQGQHVVIRUHUURUV´
(Krueger & Funder, 2004, p. 317). 2QHFRXOGWDNH)XQGHU¶VODPHQWRQHVWHSIXUWKHUZKDWLI
there were no errors in the first place? What looks like an error, viewed from an idealized 
angle, may turn out to be a successful judgment in real life. Proponents of ecological 
rationality have argued precisely this, challenging the bleak view of human reason. Many 
of the classical demonstrations of irrationality, fallacies and illusions (Kahneman, 2011; 
Kahneman et al., 1982), they claim, evaporate once we view human cognition in its proper 
ecological framework. 
Gigerenzer sees a clash between two competing conceptions of rationality. The 
traditional view is based on the content-free canons of logic and probability theory, whereas 
HFRORJLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\FRQVLVWVRIDQ³DGDSWLYH WRROER[´RIKHXULVWLFV 7RGG& Gigerenzer, 
2012; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer, 2008), each suited to a particular set of 
challenges endemic to a particular environment. In contrast with unbounded models of 
rationality, which typically assume unlimited resources both with regard to information 
JDWKHULQJDQGFRPSXWDWLRQDOSURFHVVLQJHFRORJLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\LV³IDVWDQGIUXJDO´
In order to appreciate the ecological rationality of a heuristic, one needs to look at the 
way in which it exploits the structure of the environment (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 13). 
Environment and cognition work hand in hand to produce good judgments and smart 
GHFLVLRQV,Q+HUEHUW6LPRQ¶VIDPRXVPHWDSKRUPLQGDQGHQYLURQPHQWDFWOLNHWZREODGHV
of a pair of scissors (Simon, 1955). As Gigerenzer argues, rationality does not reside in the 
mind alone, but is a feature of the mind plus the environment.  
Fast and frugal heuristics are quick and computationally cheap, requiring few and 
simple computational steps, and working on a limited input. Based on the traditional 
conception of rationality, one would expect that such quick-and-dirty rules sacrifice 
accuracy for frugality and speed. More information and computation, after all, can only 
improve judgment. Gigerenzer and colleagues have challenged this common wisdom, 
documenting many cases in which ignoring information leads to better decision-making. 
³+XPDQV DQG RWKHU DQLPDOV UHO\ RQ KHXULVWLFV LQ VLWXDWLRQV ZKHUH WKHVH DUH HFRORJLFDOO\
rational, including situations where less information and computation lead to more accurate 
juGJPHQWV´ *LJHUHQ]HU et al., 2011, p. 261). One striking instance of such less-is-more 
effects is the recognition heuristic, whereby people take advantage of their own ignorance 
to derive inferences about the unknown. In judging which out of two German cities has a 
larger population, for example, people use name recognition as a cue for population level. If 
they recognize only one city, they assume that must be the most populous one. A certain 
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level of ignorance, it turns out, is the secret to excellence in this task (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002).1 The recognition heuristic has been shown to be remarkably successful
in a wide range of domains. For example, a stock portfolio consisting of companies 
recognized by naive passers-by has been demonstrated to beat market analysts and financial 
experts (Borges et al., 1999).  
Gigerenzer has also demonstrated cases where ignoring information leads to better 
decision making. There is a family of heuristics for making decisions based on one reason 
only. The take-the-best heuristic, for example, chooses between two items by searching for 
the first cue that discriminates between them, and ignoring all the other cues. Again, one 
would expect that such simple-minded heuristics would perform worse than more complex 
decision algorithms that integrate the information of different cues. But this turns out to be 
false: one-reason decision is highly successful in a range of circumstances. 
Fast and frugal heuristics seem to violate one of the cornerstones of our traditional 
conception of rationality: the assumption that more information and computation leads to 
better decisions. How can ignorance possibly lead to better decisions than knowledge? How 
can someone who knows less about German cities be at an advantage on this topic 
compared to a more knowledgeable person? Less-is-more effects in ecological rationality, 
where using less information leads to better decisions, seem to violate what Rudolf Carnap 
has called the principle of total evidence (Gigerenzer & Sturm, 2012), according to which 
the rational course of action always takes into account all available information.  
Nothing beats success, says the proponent of ecological rationality. If decision rules 
based on classical norms of rationality fail, then we should reject those norms. In the real 
world, the content-blind norms of classical ratLRQDOLW\ DUH QRW ³UHDVRQDEOH QRUPV´
(Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 12), because the real world is too messy and complicated to be 
FDSWXUHGE\IRUPDOQRUPVRI UDWLRQDOLW\DQGEHFDXVHKXPDQUHDVRQKDV³RWKHUJRDOV WKDQ
ORJLFDO WUXWK RU FRQVLVWHQF\´ S  ,I \RX Xse the classical norms as a benchmark for 
KXPDQ UHDVRQLQJ DOO \RX HQG XSZLWK DUH VSXULRXV GHPRQVWUDWLRQV RI ³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´ DQG
³VLPSOH-PLQGHGQHVV´ WKDW IDLO WRGR MXVWLFH WRKXPDQUHDVRQLQJ³2IWHQZKDW ORRNV OLNHD
reasoning error from a purely logical perspective turns out to be a highly intelligent social 
MXGJPHQW LQ WKH UHDO ZRUOG´ *LJHUHQ]HU, 2007, p. 103). In a recent volume on adaptive 
UDWLRQDOLW\ )LHGOHU DQG:lQNH ZURWH ³$W WKH QRUPDWLYH OHYHOZH KDYH VHHQ WKDW
absolute, unique standarGVRI UDWLRQDOLW\FDQKDUGO\EHXSKHOG´7KH WUDGLWLRQDOFDQRQVRI
rationality must be supplanted by a new set of ecological canons ± enter ecological 
rationality. 
In the next section we show how the tension between classical and ecological rationality 
rests on a false opposition, based on a slippage between different loci of rationality. The 
program of ecological rationality need not lead to a backlash against classical rationality. It 
is possible to defend human reason without relinquishing classical canons of logic and 
probability. 
                                                 
1 Support for the ecological conception of human reason has also come from evolutionary psychology, in  
particular adaptationist analyses of human reason in the Santa Barbara school. Evolutionary psychologists are not 
surprised that the human mind is better designed than the pessimists would have us believe. The human brain is 
the craftwork of natural selection, after all, and evolution does not tolerate slapdash engineering (Pinker, 1997, but 
see Boudry & Pigliucci, 2013). Evolutionary psychologists Haselton & Nettle have urged us to dispel the 
³XQQHFHVVDULO\GUHDU\RXWORRNRQKXPDQFRJQLWLRQ´+DVHOWRQ& Nettle, 2006, p. 62). 
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3. Evolutionary Rationale 
(FRORJLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\ UHVLGHV QRW VR PXFK LQ HLWKHU EODGH RI 6LPRQ¶V SDLU RI VFLVVRUV
(mind/environment), but in the alignment of the two blades. But what process ensures that 
the blades align? In principle, research on fast and frugal heuristics is neutral with respect 
to how heuristics originate. Some may be constructed on the basis of learning or 
experience, some may be innate. And there are intermediate possibilities: for example, it 
may be the case that we have an innate toolbox of heuristics, but still need to learn under 
what conditions to use them (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005). In the end, however, the 
fundamental building blocks of cognition are the result of evolutionary processes. The work 
of Gigerenzer & Todd contains little explicit evolutionary theorizing, but they do 
DFNQRZOHGJH WKH XOWLPDWH HYROXWLRQDU\ RULJLQV RI KHXULVWLF UHDVRQLQJ ³HYROXWLRQ ZRXOG
seize upon informative environmental dependencies such as this one and exploit them with 
specific heuristics if they would give a decision-PDNLQJ RUJDQLVP DQ DGDSWLYH HGJH´
(Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 19)  
In other words, natural selection has aligned our minds with the environment, equipping 
us with an adaptive toolbox for navigating the world. But evolution often leaves animals 
perfectly clueless about the rationale for their behavior (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005; 
Sterelny, 2006). Just as the spider has no idea of the intricacy of her web, and the cicada has 
no clue about prime factoring, human reasoners can be blissfully unaware of the rationale 
for their heuristics. In a previous paper, we have argued that, though it is important to 
appreciate the evolutionary roots of human reason to understand its foibles, we should be 
wary of a certain locus shift in attributions of rationality (Boudry et al., 2015). In some of 
their arguments, advocates of ecological rationality have tried to get human reasoners off 
the hook by providing an adaptive rationale for their weird beliefs (e.g. superstitions). But 
human folly is perfectly compatible with adaptive behaviour. Sometimes, given costs and 
energy constraints, the most fitness-enhancing strategy is the mindless or stupid one. This 
distinction between the evolutionary and individual locus of rationality, introduced in our 
earlier paper, is also helpful to clarify the confusion about norms of rationality. 
Heuristics are the proximal implementation of evolutionary adaptations. If we argue that 
the traditional norms of rationality stand in need of revision because certain evolved 
heuristics, while demonstrably successful, seem to violate them, we are oblivious of the 
evolutionary process which shaped these heuristics. Much RI WKH³FUHGLW´ IRU WKH5	'RI
fast and frugal heuristics, particularly of course in the lower animals, does not pertain to the 
executive control of the organism itself, but to the evolutionary process responsible for its 
cognitive make-up. This means that, if the decision rules and heuristics enacted by human 
reasoners flout tKH WUDGLWLRQDO FDQRQVRI UDWLRQDOLW\ZKLOH EHLQJ µVXFFHVVIXO¶QRQHWKHOHVV
we should not jump to the conclusion that those standards of rationality are otiose. 
³6HL]LQJ´ XSRQ LQIRUPDWLRQDO GHSHQGHQFLHV LQ WKH HQYLURQPHQW DV HYROXWLRQ GLG E\
implementing simple heuristics to exploit them, is hardly a violation of the traditional 
standards of rationality.  
Evolution, to be sure, is a mindless process, but that is irrelevant to the current point 
about the locus of rationality. If heuristics are successful, that is because evolution has been 
able to track recurrent statistical properties in the environment, and has equipped us with 
the appropriate cognitive mechanisms to successfully navigate that environment. These 
statistical principles, it will turn out, do not violate the traditional canons of rationality. If 
we can reach better decisions by ignoring information, this is because evolution by natural 
VHOHFWLRQKDVILUVW³OHDUQW´ZKHQLWLVXVHIXOIRUDQRUJDQLVPWRGRVR7KLVLVQRWPDJLFRU
cognitive luck. Without the preceding R&D work carried out by evolution, stumbling in the 
dark would be a very bad idea indeed.   
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In contrast to other animal species mindlessly using their evolved heuristics, humans have 
unprecedented higher reasoning faculties with which they can reconstruct and spell out 
their own intuitive heuristics. Thanks to the human invention callHG µVFLHQFH¶ ZH FDQ
identify the underlying statistical principles and explain why they work so well in the real-
life contexts in which they are being applied. However, in order to appreciate the 
effectiveness of our heuristics in their proper environment, we need the tools of classical 
rationality. We use Bayesian probability theory to evaluate the performance of different 
heuristics against classical approaches (Martignon & Laskey, 1999). Moreover, we need 
these same tools of classical rationality to understand the statistical principles underlying 
the success of fast and frugal heuristics.  
The success of simple heuristics is not miraculous. It is based on solid statistics. By 
using the tools of classical rationality, we also understand why simple rules of thumb are 
not always better. Statisticians can now identify the conditions under which simple 
heuristics outperform or are beaten by complex decision-making strategies. In complex, 
noisy environments with a small sample size, simple heuristics outperform more complex 
and information-hungry algorithms. That is because the latter have the tendency toward 
overfitting, translating noise into complex patterns. With larger sample size and less noise, 
by contrast, complex weighting strategies have an edge. Philosophers of science have 
begun to appreciate the rationale behind our intuitive preference for simple explanations, 
and now see that the value attached to parsimony in science is not a purely aesthetic one 
(Forster & Sober, 1994; Hitchcock & Sober, 2004). In a way, they are rediscovering what 
QDWXUDOVHOHFWLRQ³NQHZ´DOODORQJ
For example, when we employ the recognition heuristic, we intuitively rely on 
statistical correlations holding between the probability that an item is recognized and the 
YDOXHRI LQWHUHVW ,I WKHKHXULVWLF LV WRZRUN WKLV³UHFRJQLWLRQYDOLGLW\´QHHGV WRRXWZHLJK
WKH ³NQRZOHGJH YDOLGLW\´ZKLFK LV WKH SUREDELOLW\ RI JLYLQJ D FRUUHFW DQVZHUZKHQ ERWK
items are recognized. In other words, your ignorance must be more valuable than your 
knowledge. Evolution must have hit upon this rationale, even though it is not inscribed 
anywhere in our brains or in our genes. What this means is that classical rationality itself is 
not threatened by the victory of simple and frugal heuristics over Bayesian networks, 
multiple regression or other standard approaches. In fact, the traditional approaches are 
needed to show why in certain contexts the particular heuristics with which evolution 
endowed us outperform traditional algorithms. 
Apart from the fact that you actually need the traditional canons of rationality to 
appreciate the excellent performance of heuristics, there is another problem with the view 
that the success of heuristic-based reasoning casts a bleak light on classical rationality. 
Suppose that an engineer is asked to design robotic life forms that are capable of surviving 
on a distant planet. Such an engineer may equip her creatures with simple decision rules if 
she knows that those will prove useful in the particular environment in which she intends 
the robots to live. The creatures may blindly use these heuristics, because there is no need 
for them to know anything about the structure of the environment. If the designer has done 
her job well and the heuristics are successful, however, we would be mistaken to conclude 
WKDW WKH ³VLPSOH-PLQGHGQHVV´ RI WKHVH URERWV YLRODWHV WKH WUDGLWLRQDO FRQFHSWLRQ RI
rationality. The ultimate rationality of these heuristics does not reside in their decision 
rules, after all, but in the foresighted work of their designer. The robots were just 
SURJUDPPHGWRFDUU\RXWWKHGHVLJQHU¶VLQVWUXFWLRQV7KHSURJUDPPHULVFDOOLQJWKHVKRWV
and for her the benchmark will still be the familiar framework of statistics, Bayesian 
updating, logic, etc. The same goes for that blind engineer we call natural selection. What 
underlies the success of heuristics is precisely the statistical and logical relations that 
natural selection has exploited. Indeed, if the ancestral environments had been such that, 
say, the average validity of the recognition cue were low (weighted over fitness costs and 
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benefits), then evolution would not have endowed us with the recognition heuristic in the 
first place. In a similar way, an engineer who develops a computational toolkit for a robot 
to survive in a novel environment will only design and implement heuristic principles if 
they promote success in the kind of environment that the robot will encounter.  
It is tempting to think that the remarkable success of fast and frugal heuristics flouts the 
standards of rationality, if you focus only on the proximal implementation of these 
heuristics. For example, as a violation of the rationality of coherence norms, Gigerenzer 
mentions WKDW SUH\ DQLPDOV RIWHQ GLVSOD\ ³LQFRQVLVWHQW EHKDYLRU´ ZKHQ LQWHUDFWLQJ ZLWK
their predators, to reduce the predictability of their behavior (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 
22). But this is hardly a violation of coherence norms. When taking penalty shots, soccer 
players are trying to outsmart the goalkeeper: the goalkeeper tries to predict which corner 
the shooter is going to aim at, while the shooter tries to behave in an unpredictable manner, 
possibly also tricking his opponent into thinking that he (the shooter) is predictable (and 
then aiming for the other corner). Nothing in this strategic game violates coherence criteria 
of rationality: a rational agent can decide to engage in unpredictable behavior for strategic 
reasons. Whether or not hunted animals engage in any conscious deliberation as to what 
their next move will be, it is clear that the logic of deception and counter-deception is 
undergirding their behavior (von Hippel & Trivers, ,IWKHDQLPDOKDVQ¶WILJXUHGWKLV
out, then surely evolution must have. As Dennett wrote, if we discover that an animal is too 
simple-minded to harbor an adaptive rationale, we do not discard the rationale, but are 
VLPSO\IRUFHGWR³SDVVWKHUDWLRQDOHIURPWKHLQGLYLGXDOWRWKHHYROYLQJJHQRW\SH´'HQQHWW, 
1983, p. 351). 
3.1 General and Content-Free Rationality 
At the level of the heuristic-wielding organism, reasoning looks like a jumble of simple 
tools and tricks. But the rationality that arises at the evolutionary level is general and 
context-free in the sense envisaged by proponents of classical rationality. Natural selection 
is a content-free and general process, an abstract algorithm that works whenever certain 
minimal conditions are satisfied (variation, heritability, differential reproduction) (Dawkins, 
1983; Dennett, ,W³OHDUQV´E\DJJUHJDWLQJVWDWLVWLFDOLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHVXFFHVVRI
various genotypes in various environments. It does not learn by using a bag of tricks. This 
mindless process produces only a simulacrum of rationality (de Sousa, 2007), but it is a 
simulacrum that respects the norms of classical rationality, and that we can understand 
using classical tools. For example, the theory of error management in evolutionary biology 
(Galperin & Haselton, 2012; Haselton & Buss, 2000) is essentially an application of 
expected utility theory and signal detection theory to adaptive problems encountered by 
evolution.  
There is thus something ironic about the claim of evolutionary psychologists Tooby and 
&RVPLGHV WKDWKXPDQUHDVRQ LV³EHWWHU WKDQUDWLRQDO´ LQ WKHVHQVH WKDW LWEHDWV WUDGLWLRQDO
methods:   
For the problem domains they are designed to operate on, specialized problem-solving 
methods perform in a manner that is better than rational; that is, they can arrive at 
successful outcomes that canonical general-purpose rational methods can at best not 
arrive at as efficiently, and more commonly cannot arrive at all. Such evolutionary 
considerations suggest that traditional normative and descriptive approaches to 
rationality need to be reexamined. (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994, p. 329) 
In a trivial sense, this cannot be true. If simple heuristics breed more success than 
sophisticated methods in certain environments, given some agreed goal or benchmark, then 
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ipso facto it is (instrumentally) rational to prefer these heuristics. It is rational to prefer 
methods with demonstrable success. More importantly, the only reason why our fast and 
frugal heuristics outperform general-purpose methods of rationality is that they were 
designed by a general-purpose information-processing algorithm in the first place: 
evolution by natural selection. If evolution had not done the hard work for us, we would be 
stumbling in the dark. Or we would not be here at all. Tooby and Cosmides, of all people, 
should be sympathetic to this point.  
,IRQHORVHVVLJKWRIWKHFUXFLDOUROHRIHYROXWLRQLQDOLJQLQJWKHWZREODGHVRI6LPRQ¶V
pair of scissors, the proficiency of our heuristics and intuitions seems almost miraculous, or 
a matter of sheer luck. Matheson (2006, p. 142) worries that the program of ecological 
UDWLRQDOLW\VLWXDWHVUDWLRQDOLW\³SDUWO\RXWVLGHRIWKHPLQG´DVKHXULVWLFVDUHRnly successful 
UHODWLYH WR D FHUWDLQ HQYLURQPHQW 7KLV ZRXOG DPRXQW WR D IRUP RI ³FRJQLWLYH OXFN´
according to Matheson, which abandons one of the central tenets of the Enlightenment view 
of rationality, according to which rationality inhabits the mind alone. But how could we be 
the source and imprimatur of our own rationality? There was a time when there were no 
KXPDQV DURXQG ,I WKH VRXUFH RI RXU UDWLRQDOLW\ ZHUH ³ZKROO\ ZLWKLQ RXU PLQGV´ DV
Matheson put it, we would have pulled ourselves up by our own hair, a godlike feat. It 
ZRXOGEHPRUHDFFXUDWH WR VD\ WKDW*LJHUHQ]HU¶VSURJUDPVKLIWVSDUWRI WKHFUHGLW IRU WKH
³UDWLRQDOLW\´RIKXPDQEHKDYLRUWRWKHHYROXWLRQDU\SURFHVVJLYLQJULVHWRLW,WLVHYROXWLRQ
by natural selection that ensures that there is a match between our mind and the 
environment. This may be a fortuitous arrangement as far as human beings are concerned 
(at least most of the time), but it is certainly not a matter of accident. 
4. Individual-level rationality 
The traditional canons of rationality have not been vanquished. They have merely been 
UHOHJDWHGWRWKHORFXVRIHYROXWLRQDU\DGDSWDWLRQ$V2UJHO¶VVHFRQGUXOHKDVLW(YROXWLRQLV
cleverer than we are. In our previous paper on the program of ecological rationality 
(Boudry et al., 2015), however, we discerned a second strand in the research spearheaded 
by Gigerenzer, which does not involve any adaptive locus shifts. This second strand argues 
WKDWH[SHULPHQWDOGHPRQVWUDWLRQVRI³LUUDWLRQDOLW\´DUHRIWHQWKHUHVXOWRIDUWLILFLDOVHW-ups, 
which truncate the nuances and complexities of real-life contexts. Psychologists hold 
subjects accountable to a norm of reasoning that simply fails to capture the ecological 
complexity of real life. 
Take the phenomenon of preference reversals, which have (previously) been interpreted 
as a form of inconsistent behavior, violating the norms of transitivity (if A < B, B < C; then 
it follows that A < C). Recent research, however, shows that such behavior can be seen as 
adaptive, provided we take into account the changing context under which decisions are 
being made (Schuck-Paim et al., 2004). For instance, the organism may be in (slightly) 
different states when making choices, which affects the fitness value assigned to A, B and 
C. Does this show that there is anything wrong with coherence criteria of rationality? No. If 
choice A turns out to be valued differently by the organism, depending on the context, there 
LV QR VXFK WKLQJ DV µWKH¶ ILWQHVV YDOXH RI $ DQG WKH DOOHJHG YLRODWLRQ RI WUDQVLWLYLW\
disappears. Houston et al.  KDYH DOVR VKRZQ WKDW µLQWUDQVLWLYH¶ EHKDYLRU PD\ EH
fitness-maximizing even if the organism is in the same state when making different choices. 
In their model, the organism is presented with two out of three alternatives each time (A or 
B; A or C; B or C), while having varying internal energy levels. Within a certain range of 
energy levels, choices across settings may appear intransitive, for instance ranking A over 
B, B over C, and C over A. This phenomenon occurs because the availability of an option, 
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even when not chosen, changes the fitness value of the preferred option, because its 
SUHVHQFH³PD\DFWDVDQLQVXUDQFHDJDLQVWDUXQRIEDGOXFNLQWKHIXWXUH´+RXVWRQet al.
2007, p. 365). Humans and other organisms often (reasonably) assume that the same 
options will persist in the future (i.e. that the environment will stay roughly the same). 
Because organisms make different predictions about future options, sometimes intransitive 
ranking may maximize fitness. But of course that is no reason to jettison the transitivity 
norm as an axiom of rationality. As Houston et al. explain: 
Decisions appear to violate transitivity if an observer interprets a single choice by an 
animal with given reserves as indicating a straightforward preference for one option
over another, instead of viewing the choice as a consequence of following the optimal 
reserve-dependent strategy. (Houston et al., 2007, p. 367) 
In other words, the violation of transitivity is in the eye of the beholder. To use a well-
known analogy from Karl Popper (1963, 2002), when you add two drops of water, they join 
and form a single drop. But that does not mean that arithmetic (1+1=2) has been falsified.  
As another example, let us consider the conjunction rule of probability theory: the 
principle that the conjunction of two events can never have a higher probability than that of 
either event happening alone. This rule was allegedly violated in the famous Linda 
problem: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. 
As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
Which is more probable? 
(A) Linda is a bank teller. 
(B) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
,Q WKHLU RULJLQDO UHVHDUFK RQ ZKDW EHFDPH NQRZQ DV WKH ³/LQGD SUREOHP´ 7YHUVN\ DQG
Kahneman (1983) held human reasoners accountable to the conjunction rule, which entails 
that B cannot be more probable than A. Still, the majority of subjects answered B.  
*LJHUHQ]HUKRZHYHUSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³SUREDEOH´FDQDOVRPHDQSODXVLEOHVHQVLEOHRU
supported by evidence (Gigerenzer, 1996; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). Kahneman and 
7YHUVN\ H[SHFW VXEMHFWV WR LQWHUSUHW ³SUREDEOH´ LQ WKH VHQVH RIPDWKHPDWLFDO SUREDELOLW\
but as a number of researchers have pointed out (e.g. Dulany & Hilton, 1991), this construal 
violates pragmatic rules of conversational inference, in particular the maxim of relevance 
(Grice, 1989).2 If subjects interpret the story as Kahneman wanted them to, it becomes a 
trivial logical exercise, in which the whole description of Linda becomes irrelevant. 
We think Gigerenzer is on solid ground here. But does this mean there is anything 
wrong with the conjunction rule, or that subjects have violated it? Gigerenzer strongly 
LPSOLHVWKDWWKHDQVZHUVWRWKHVHTXHVWLRQVLV\HV³>7@KH/LQGDSUREOHPFUHDWHVDFRQWH[W
[«] that makes it perfectly valid not to conform to the cRQMXQFWLRQUXOH´*LJHUHQ]HU, 1996, 
S³>$@GKHULQJ WR VRFLDOQRUPVKHUHFRQYHUVDWLRQDOPD[LPV LV UDWLRQDO DOWKRXJK LW
FRQIOLFWV ZLWK FODVVLFDO UDWLRQDOLW\´ +HUWZLJ & Gigerenzer, 1999, p. 300). Whereas 
Kahneman & Tversky choose to retain the norms, after having demonstrated that humans 
URXWLQHO\YLRODWHWKHP*LJHUHQ]HUXUJHVXVWR³UHWKLQNWKHQRUPV´WKHPVHOYHV*LJHUHQ]HU, 
 S  6LPLODUO\ 3RORQLROL¶V  S  FRQFOXVLRQ DERXW WKH ZRUN RI WKH $%&
                                                 
2 For a relevance explanation of human performance on the Wason Selection Task, see Sperber, Cara, and Girotto 
(1995). 
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research group on the Linda problem is WKDW³YLRODWLQJWKHQRUPVRIFRKHUHQFHPLJKWEHD
NH\FRQGLWLRQIRUVXFFHVVIXOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´
But the conjunction rule of classical probability theory emerges unscathed after the 
ecological reframing of Linda, because if subjects construe the problem as Gigerenzer 
WKLQNVWKH\GRWKHUXOHLVQHYHU³YLRODWHG´LQWKHILUVWSODFH7KHFRQYHUVDWLRQDOPD[LPRI
relevance can hardly clash with the conjunction rule if the former simply dictates a 
FRQVWUXDORIWKHSUREOHPWKDWIDOOVRXWVLGHWKHODWWHU¶VGRPDLQRIapplication.  
3DUW RI*LJHUHQ]HU¶V GHPRQVWUDWLRQ WKDW.DKQHPDQKDV XQGHUHVWLPDWHG KLV VXEMHFWV LV
that, when presented in a frequency format, the so-FDOOHG³FRJQLWLYHLOOXVLRQ´GLVDSSHDUV,Q
this version of the problem, subjects are told that  
There are  SHRSOHZKR ILW WKH GHVFULSWLRQ DERYH LH /LQGD¶V.  How many of 
them are  
(A) Bank tellers?  
(B) Bank tellers and active in the feminist movement?   
(Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 250) 
This presentation of the problem avoids WKHDPELJXLW\RIWKHWHUP³SUREDEOH´DQGQDUURZV
down on the construal of mathematical probability. In this case, subjects give the 
appropriate response, as indeed they should do. Even Gigerenzer implicitly admits that the 
conjunction rule is normatively binding to the extent that it is applicable. In other words, 
the problem lies not with the norm, but simply with certain misapplications of the norm.3
5. Discussion 
There are two ways in which the program of ecological rationality can be construed as a 
challenge to the canons of classical rationality. First, advocates of ecological rationality 
have pointed to forms of heuristic intelligence that, though apparently at odds with classical 
rationality, fare quite well in the real world. What looks like an error, from the myopic view 
of classical rationality, turns out to be an effective judgment in proper ecological context. 
,I RQH ORVHV VLJKW RI WKH µKLGGHQ HQJLQHHU¶ ± i.e. natural selection ± invisibly shaping 
these successful heuristics, it is tempting to conclude that the benchmark of traditional 
rationality against which human behavior had been judged is somehow deficient. It is not. 
The norms simply re-emerge at the evolutionary level, where the adaptive rationale of 
human cognition resides. The cognitive heuristics of the gene-carrying vehicles ± us ± are 
PHUHO\ SUR[LPDO LPSOHPHQWDWLRQV RI HYROXWLRQ¶V DFTXLUHG ZLVGRP DERXW DQFHVWUDO
environments ± their success is not miraculous, and they would not work in all 
environments. Fast and frugal heuristics can beat sophisticated algorithms only because the 
R&D has already been carried out by evolution. And that R&D exploits the traditional 
canons of rationality. Moreover, heuristics can and do err, for instance when there is a 
                                                 
3 In this context, Gigerenzer has also made the additional argument that Kahneman and his colleagues stick with 
one conception of probability, ignoring alternative conceptions in the field of statistics (e.g. Gigerenzer, 2000, pp. 
241-266). In particular, Kahneman adopts a Bayesian conception of probability and neglects the influential
frequentist school, according to which single-event probabilities such as the ones used in the Linda problem are 
meaningless in any case. If the human mind is frequentist, as Gigerenzer claims it is, people cannot make the 
mistakes that Kahneman attributes to them. However, we think this is a red herring that detracts from the main 
SUREOHP ZLWK .DKQHPDQ¶V GHPRQVWUDWLRQ RI WKH FRQMXQFWLRQ IDOODF\ ZKLFK LV WKH DPELJXLW\ RI WKH ZRUG
³SUREDEOH´ DQG WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQDO LPSOLFDWXUHV )RU D JRRG FULWLFLVP RI*LJHUHQ]HU¶V UHVRUW WR SOXUDOLVP DERXW
statistical norms, see Bishop and Trout (2005, pp. 118-137).  
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mismatch between the environments to which they were adapted and the one in which they 
are now being applied. In such cases, evolution cannot get us off the hook: adaptive 
explanations cannot exculpate blatant forms of human irrationality (Boudry et al., 2015).  
As for the second challenge, when we consider how content-free logical norms fail to 
capture the intricacies and nuances of human judgment, it is tempting to conclude that there 
must be something wrong with those norms. But again, this is mistaken. Effective judgment 
can hardly violate the traditional norms of rationality when these norms do not apply. 
Bayesian theory, the conjunction rule and the transitivity rule (and other coherence norms) 
emerge intact after the ecological gestalt switch. The problem here is the rigid
(mis)application of content-free logical norms, not the norms as such. Indeed, we need 
those tools to understand why fast and frugal heuristics are successful in the first place.  
While we welcome a naturalized and evolutionary take on human reason, and we agree 
with Gigerenzer that it is time to correct the bleak picture of human reason, we have argued 
that the rhetoric against the traditional canons of rationality is unwarranted. Ecological 
rationality does not challenge, let alone refute, the classical norms of rationality. 
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